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WRITTEN SUBMISSION FROM DR ARMAN SARVARIAN, LECTURER IN 
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SURREY AND DIRECTOR, SURREY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTRE 
 
1. This is a submission of written evidence in response to the call published by 
the Scottish Parliament European and External Relations Committee ('the 
Committee') concerning its inquiry on ‘The Scottish Government’s proposals 
for an independent Scotland: membership of the European Union’. In this 
submission, I address the second of the three key themes of the inquiry: ‘the 
road to membership and Scotland’s representation in the EU’. In particular, I 
examine the legal aspects of the following issues: 1) the implications of the 
Scottish Government’s proposal that it will approach EU membership 
negotiations on the principle of continuity of effect; 2) whether there are any 
potential obstacles to Scotland’s membership that might arise during the 
negotiations; and 3) whether there might be potential for the Court of Justice 
to rule in relations to any aspects of the transition process.   
2. In composing this submission, I make reference to the Legal Opinion of 
Professors James Crawford SC and Alan Boyle (‘Crawford-Boyle Legal 
Opinion’) and the White Paper of the Scottish Government. I submit this 
evidence in order to assist the inquiry in its examination of the problems of the 
law of State succession (‘the replacement of one State by another in the 
responsibility for the international relations of territory’1) in relation to 
membership of international organisations (e.g. – the European Union) arising 
out of the putative secession of Scotland from the United Kingdom. 
Specifically, I focus upon the absence of a clear legal framework providing for 
an orderly process of succession to membership and the potential for the 
case of Scotland to fill this gap by setting a precedent for other regions that 
may aspire to secede from European Union Member States (in particular, 
Catalonia).  
3. The submission is structured as follows:  1) State succession to membership 
of international organisations and continuity of effect; 2) obstacles to 
Scotland’s membership of the European Union; and 3) the potential for the 
Court of Justice to rule upon succession issues. A summary of conclusions 
and recommendations is provided at the end of the submission. 
  
State succession to international organisations and continuity of effect 
 
Lack of normativity in State succession to membership of international 
organisations 
 
4. Whilst the putative secession of Scotland raises a number of succession 
problems (e.g. – succession to assets and debts), the focus of this 
submission is upon the succession of Scotland as a seceding territory to 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. – Art. 2(1)(b) Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978. 
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membership of the European Union. Analysis of this issue falls under the 
category of succession to membership of international organisations in 
general. Thus, this evidence does not address succession to property and 
only addresses succession to treaties insofar as it touches and concerns 
succession to membership of international organisations.  
5. International law governing succession to membership of international 
organisations is subject to considerable confusion and no small degree of 
politicisation: ‘traditional critiques of the law of state succession, which posit it 
as an area dominated by politically-motivated bilateral agreements rather than 
generalizable rules, predicated upon the will of ‘new’ states rather than 
general principles of automaticity, and dependent upon recognition by other 
states parties, retain their salience.’2 In spite of modern practice in the former 
Yugoslavia, the former USSR and elsewhere, there remains considerable 
demand for normativity in this area of law.  
6. In 1963, the International Law Commission3 devoted renewed attention to the 
topic of State succession amidst the ongoing phenomenon of imperial 
decolonisation.4 It decided to split the topic into three categories: 1) 
succession in respect to treaties; 2) succession in respect of rights and duties 
resulting from sources other than treaties; and 3) succession in respect of 
membership of international organisations. In 1967, the Commission 
appointed Special Rapporteurs for the first two topics but decided to leave 
aside, for the time being, the third heading ‘which it considered to be related 
both to succession in respect of treaties and to relations between States and 
inter-governmental organizations.’5 In light of the problems arising out of 
decolonisation, the Commission gave priority to the topic of succession to 
treaties and appointed Sir Humphrey Waldock as Special Rapporteur for that 
topic.  
7. The work of the Commission over the course of the succeeding decade 
culminated in the adoption, on 23 August 1978, of the Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978 (‘VCSS’).6 Following the 
ratification of that treaty by fifteen States,7 the VCSS entered into force on 6 
November 1996. As of the date of this submission, there are twenty-two 
parties to the treaty and an additional nineteen signatories.8 The decision to 
leave aside succession to membership of international organisations, though 
                                                 
2 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Eighth Edition, 2012), 444. 
3 The International Law Commission is a committee of experts created in 1947 by the UN General 
Assembly to work for ‘the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification’. As a sub-organ of the Sixth (Legal) Committee, its reports and proposals are formally 
advisory but carry great persuasive weight. Its work has directly led to the adoption of, for example, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982 and the Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998.   
4 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1968), Vol. II, 213-215.  
5 Ibidem, 215 (para. 40). 
6 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1946, 3. 
7 VCSS, Art. 49. 
8 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
2&chapter=23&lang=en.  
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understandable from a practical perspective in light of the priorities of the day, 
has arguably had the unintended consequence of creating confusion 
concerning the degree to which it is subsumed within the VCSS (i.e. – 
membership is implicitly addressed by resolving the question of succession to 
treaties) or simply left to be addressed on a case-by-case basis without 
generality.  
   
The inapplicability of the VCSS  
 
8. The United Kingdom has neither signed nor ratified the VCSS. In the absence 
of ratification by the UK, the VCSS is not applicable as a whole to the case of 
Scotland. However, specific provisions of the treaty may be applicable 
through customary international law.9 The compulsoriness of a particular rule 
requires an evaluation of the practice of States as well as States’ views of its 
legal authoritativeness. Sources for these criteria include, but are not limited 
to: decisions by national and international courts and tribunals, the conduct of 
States towards seceding territories (e.g. – the extension or withholding of 
recognition) and the practice of international organisations regarding the 
admission of succeeding States.  
9. Article 4(a) VCSS provides that the Convention ‘applies to the effects of a 
succession of States in respect of any treaty which is the constituent 
instrument of an international organization without prejudice to the rules 
concerning acquisition of membership and without prejudice to any other 
relevant rules of the organization’. This provision, which is identical to the text 
proposed in the ILC draft,10 envisages that the Convention acts as a gap-filler 
where the rules of the organisation do not address succession to 
membership. As the commentary to the article observes: ‘This is all the more 
necessary in that succession in respect of constituent instruments necessarily 
encroaches upon the question of admission to membership which in many 
organizations is subject to particular conditions’.11 
 
10. The relevant provisions of the VCSS are Articles 34 and 35: 
 
Article 34  
Succession of States in cases of separation of parts of a State 
 
                                                 
9 In addition to treaties, custom is the second main source of international law - Art.38(1) Statute of the 
International Court of Justice 1945. The two well-known criteria for the formation of customary law are: 1) 
the practice of States; and 2) the legal opinions or positions of States (opinio iuris sive necessitatis). 
Crudely put, the former criterion entails ‘what States have done’ whereas the latter concerns ‘why (legally) 
States have done it’. The formation of a customary rule is necessarily a retrospective exercise: to determine 
whether a customary rule exists, international courts, scholars and others examine the precedents of State 
practice to distil whether the rule commands sufficient support amongst States. 
10 ILC Draft articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with commentaries 1974, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission (1974), Vol. II, Part One.  
11 Ibidem, 177.  
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1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or more 
States, whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist:  
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the 
entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each 
successor State so formed;  
(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect only 
of that part of the territory of the predecessor State which has become a 
successor State continues in force in respect of that successor State alone. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:  
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; or  
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of 
the treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for 
its operation. 
 
Article 35 
Position if a State continues after separation of part of its territory 
 
When, after separation of any part of the territory of a State, the predecessor 
State continues to exist, any treaty which at the date of the succession of 
States was in force in respect of the predecessor State continues in force in 
respect of its remaining territory unless: 
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; 
(b) it is established that the treaty related only to the territory which has 
separated from the predecessor State; or 
(c) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of 
the treaty in respect of the predecessor State would be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for 
its operation. 
11. The rules under Article 34(1) and 35 entail automatic succession to treaty 
participation for both the ‘parent State’ and the seceding territory. This has 
been juxtaposed to the co-called tabula rasa or ‘clean slate’ principle, 
whereby a newly independent State is deemed not to be bound by the 
obligations entered into by its predecessor save insofar as it expressly or 
implicitly accepts them. Articles 16 and 24(1) VCSS support this view. 
Although on its face this provides for a conflict between two rules, they are 
reconcilable on the basis that either: 1) that successor States are not bound 
to accept preceding treaties but have the right or facility to do so unless the 
Article 34(2) exceptions apply; or 2) a distinction applies between decolonised 
States, to which the clean slate principle applies, and other seceding States 
to which a general rule of continuity of treaty rights and obligations applies.12  
12. A survey of decisions by both international and national courts and tribunals 
suggests that there is considerable inconsistency and confusion concerning 
the authoritativeness of Articles 34 and 35. For example, whilst parties have 
                                                 
12 Shaw, International Law (2008), 975-981.   
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invoked Article 34 VCSS as customary international law before the 
International Court of Justice13 the Court has hitherto declined to pronounce 
upon its customary status.  
13. Croatia was held to be a successor to the SFRY in respect of an extradition 
treaty by a US court,14 which made no reference to the VCSS or international 
law but relied upon Croatia’s invocation of the treaty and US precedent. The 
succession of Kosovo to participation in an extradition treaty was examined 
but not decided by a Kosovar court,15 which held that the VCSS was not in 
force in Kosovo but some of its provisions reflected customary international 
law. 
14. The continuation by Russia of the participation of the USSR in treaties was 
accepted by national courts in Cyprus16 and Russia17 referring not to the 
VCSS but rather to bilateral practice and academic scholarship. Its 
continuation or succession to the USSR with respect to personal rights and 
obligations arising out of the Austrian State Treaty was accepted by an 
Austrian court18 solely on the basis of the express declaration, as an 
exception to the general rule. The succession of Armenia to the participation 
of the USSR in a bilateral treaty on social security was accepted by a Czech 
court,19 applying Article 34 VCSS as customary international law.  
15. The succession of the Ukraine to the participation of the USSR in the Hague 
Convention on Civil Procedure 1954 was rejected by a Belgian court with a 
very brief analysis of international law, in which it omitted to examine the 
applicability of Articles 34-35 VCSS.20 The succession of the Ukraine as a 
successor to the USSR in respect of a commercial treaty was left open by a 
Swiss court,21 which recognised Articles 24 and 34 VCSS as customary 
                                                 
13 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), [1996] ICJ Rep.595, 
611-612; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ]1997] ICJ Rep. 7, 71.   
14 Arambasic (Mitar) v. Ashcroft (John) and others, South Dakota (18 November 2005), Oxford Reports on 
International Law, ILDC 709 (US 2005).  
15 BA, Final ruling upon request for extradition, Supreme Court of Kosovo (disputed), ILDC 1964 (KO 
2010).   
16 Article 155(4) of the Constitution and Articles 3 and 9 of the 1964 Administration of Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Re, Botrov (Alexander Valentinovich) v. Cyprus, Supreme Court of Cyprus 
(9 August 1996), Oxford Reports on International Law, ILDC 919 (CY 1996)(on succession to a bilateral 
extradition treaty).   
17 CJSC ‘LUCH’ v. Ministry of Transportation and others, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (18 
September 2009), Oxford Reports on International Law, ILDC 721 (RU 2009)(on succession to the 
Customs Convention on International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets 1975, 1079 UNTS 
89).  
18 S v. Austria, Supreme Court of Justice (30 September 2002), Oxford Reports on International Law, ILDC 
1618 (AT 2002).  
19 VJ v. Czech Social Security Administration, Supreme Administrative Court (28 November 2008), Oxford 
Reports on International Law, ILDC 1405 (CZ 2008).  
20 Azov Shipping Company v. Werf-en Vlasnatie NV, Court of Appeal (19 March 2001), Oxford Reports on 
International Law, ILDC 43 (BE 2001).  
21 X and Y v. Government of the Canton of Zurich and Administrative Tribunal of the Canton of Zurich, 
Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland (22 November 2005), Oxford Reports on International Law, ILDC 
340 (Ch 2005).  
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international law but left the applicability of Article 34 to the case at hand open 
due to the vagueness of the Ukraine’s commitment to succeed to USSR 
treaties in 1991. Subsequent to the decision, Switzerland and the Ukraine 
agreed to treat the Ukraine as a successor to bilateral Soviet-Swiss treaties. 
16. Thus, the law of State succession to treaties is regrettably in a state of 
considerable confusion and inconsistency. In particular, the status of Article 
34 VCSS as customary international law has yet to become a settled and 
consistent body of practice and in most situations succession matters have 
been addressed in a sporadic and ad hoc manner. I respectfully agree with 
the conclusion of the Crawford-Boyle Opinion at para. 119: ‘insofar as any 
claim by the SNP or Scottish Government that Scotland would remain a 
member of international organisations is based on the Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978, it can be dismissed as, 
at best, inconclusive.’  
 
Membership of the United Nations 
 
17. Since its decision in 1967 to leave aside the matter of succession to 
membership of international organisations, the ILC has yet to return to the 
topic. In the absence of efforts to codify the law, it must be discerned from the 
practice of States and international organisations. According to one classical 
treatise: 
 
‘Whether succession occurs to membership of international organizations is 
less a question of principles of State succession than of construction of the 
relevant constitutional provisions of the organizations’ charters. In most 
instances the membership clauses exclude the possibility of succession; in a 
few instances succession could be implied by these clauses; in a remaining 
few instances no guidance is to be gained from the membership clauses and 
it is only in these instances that resort to customary international law is 
necessary. Generally speaking, rights and obligations of voting, with specific 
quotas of votes, and obligations of contributing to the organizations’ 
expenses, with fixed quotas of contributions, make it impossible to accept a 
successor State as a successor in membership.’22 
 
This suggests that the traditional presumption has been that successor States 
apply de novo for membership rather than automatically succeeding to it.23  
18. The practice of the UN has been both influential and consistent on this issue: 
all new States are required to apply de novo for membership. In 1947, 
Pakistan was required to apply for membership whereas India was accepted 
as the continuation of the existing membership of pre-partition India.24 Whilst 
                                                 
22 O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law (1967), 183.  
23 See further, e.g. – Zimmerman, ‘State succession’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (November 2006), para. 16; Shaw, supra note 11, 985-986; Crawford, supra note 2, 442-443.   
24 O’Connell, supra note 22, 184-187.  
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Pakistan appended a declaration to its instrument of acceptance that it 
considered itself to be a co-successor with India to pre-partition India rather 
than a new member, its view was  not accepted.  
19. As a reaction to this case, the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the UN General 
Assembly examined the question: ‘What are the legal rules to which, in the 
future, a State or States entering into international life through the division of 
a Member State of the United Nations should be subject?’ The Committee 
adopted the following principles: 
 
‘1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal principles to presume 
that a State which is a Member of the Organization of the United Nations 
does not cease to be a Member simply because its Constitution or tis frontier 
have been subjected to changes, and that the extinction of the State as a 
legal personality recognized in the international order must be shown before 
its rights and obligations can be considered thereby to have ceased to exist.  
2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the Territory and the 
populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a State 
Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter 
claim the status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has been 
formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.  
3. Beyond that, each case must be judged according to its merits.’ 
 
 
This approach has been consistently applied to seceding States in 
subsequent cases, e.g. – Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011). In 
1974, the ILC in its commentary to Article 4 VCSS noted:  
 
‘International organizations take various forms and differ considerably in their 
treatment of membership. In many organizations, membership, other than 
original membership, is subject to a formal process of admission. Where this 
is so, practice appears now to have established the principle that a new State 
is not entitled automatically to become a party to the constituent treaty and a 
member of the organization as a successor State simply by reason of the fact 
that at the date of the succession its territory was subject to the treaty and 
within the ambit of the organization…New States have, therefore, been 
regarded as entitled to become Members of the United Nations only by 
admission and not by succession. The same practice has been followed in 
regard to membership of the specialized agencies and of numerous other 
organizations.’25 
 
As the Commission commented, the practice has been that where formal 
admission rules exist in the constituent treaty of an organisation, those rules 
apply to successor States, but in the absence of those rules Article 34 VCSS 
                                                 
25 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 10, 177-178 (para. 2). 
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applies to enable that State to automatically succeed to membership by 
notification.26 
20. Important modern precedents have been the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (‘USSR’). In the latter case, the Russian Federation was accepted 
by the UN as the continuation of the USSR whereas the remaining fourteen 
successor States to the USSR were required to apply for UN membership. 
However, the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the continuation 
of the SFRY was controversially rejected by the UN and gave rise to difficult 
legal issues before the International Court of Justice.27 Eventually, the FRY 
discontinued its claim and was admitted to the UN as a new Member State in 
2000. In general, the practice of other international organisations has followed 
the UN model with the notable exceptions of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank which have applied an automatic succession approach.  
21. Against this background, I respectfully concur with the conclusion of the 
Crawford-Boyle Legal Opinion at para. 132: ‘So there may be no general rule 
in international law governing succession to membership of international 
organisations. But at least in the case of the UN, Scotland would be required 
to join as a new state whereas the [rump UK] would retain the UK’s 
membership – including its permanent seat on the Security Council.’ 
22. An important exception to this approach may be membership of the Council of 
Europe. Practice of that organisation with respect to Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic and Montenegro has been to treat the Convention as being 
‘continuously in force’ in those States in spite of their non-membership 
pending applications for accession to the organisation.28 This practice is 
pursuant to a policy of ensuring continuity of application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950 to preclude prejudice to applicants during 
the interregnum.29 In this respect, it is desirable that the Scottish Government 
and UK Government agree in negotiations upon a transitional date 
concerning responsibility for human rights claims emanating from Scotland to 
ensure a smooth handover before the European Court of Human Rights. 
Although the conclusion of Professors Crawford and Boyle that the rump UK 
would likely continue the UK membership whereas Scotland would have to 
apply de novo is probable, another possibility is that Scotland will be treated 
as having automatically succeeded. It would be logical and efficient to fix the 
handover date for respondent status to be contemporaneous with Scotland’s 
accession to the Council of Europe, so as to ensure that Scotland would 
enjoy institutional benefits at the same time as it would bear institutional 
responsibility.   
 
The White Paper 
                                                 
26 Ibidem, 178 (paras 3-4).  
27 See further Shaw, supra note 12, 962-963.  
28 Crawford-Boyle Legal Opinion, paras 136-139.  
29 See further Shaw, supra note 11, 981-984.  
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23. Concerning ‘membership of international organisations and international 
obligations’, the White Paper states at paragraph 268:  
 
‘Following a vote for independence the Scottish Government will formally 
declare Scotland’s intention to become a member of NATO following normal 
procedures. Similarly we will also signal our intention to be a member of the 
United Nations at that time. Given that Scotland, as part of the UK, already 
meets membership requirements, we do not expect any barriers to Scotland’s 
timely membership of international organisations.’30  
 
Whilst this statement seemingly makes no claim to automatic succession, it 
may be criticised for incorrectly conflating the status of Scotland as a region 
within the United Kingdom with its status as a new State. The one does not 
have any direct bearing upon the other. Nevertheless, the statement is correct 
insofar as an independent Scotland would be unlikely to encounter significant 
obstacles in its application for admission to the UN as a new Member State – 
particularly in light of the express disclaiming of the UK seat on the Security 
Council.31   
24. The White Paper could be improved by greater specificity concerning the 
timeline for admission to the UN. In this respect, it should be emphasised 
that, in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote in the Referendum on Independence for 
Scotland, the process of secession from the United Kingdom would not 
necessarily (and, indeed, would be unlikely to) entail a comprehensive, single 
incision by which Scotland would dissolve its legal status as a region of the 
United Kingdom and apply for admission to international organisations all in a 
day. In this respect, the proposed ‘independence date’ of 24 March 201632 
may not reflect the reality of a gradual process of secession. 
25. To the contrary, in light of the nuanced and complex issues entailed in the 
particular case of Scotland, it is plausible that a gradual process of secession 
would be envisaged in the negotiations between the Scottish Government 
and the Government of the United Kingdom to follow a ‘Yes’ outcome in the 
referendum. On this approach, following the conclusion of these negotiations 
but prior to the formal date of secession, Scotland could apply for admission 
to the UN and other international organisations and thus synchronise its date 
of secession so as to coincide with its admission to the UN. Although, in an 
analogous case, Montenegro submitted its UN application on 5 June 2006 
(the day after its declaration of independence and two weeks after its 
referendum on independence) and was admitted to the UN on 28 June, there 
is no UN rule prohibiting seceding States from tendering an application for 
admission prior to a formal declaration of independence.33  Consequently, the 
                                                 
30 See also White Paper, 226-227. 
31 White Paper, 462 (para. 271).  
32 Ibidem, 51. 
33 For example, the Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were 
admitted to membership despite not being ‘States’ for Article 4 of the UN Charter. 
  10
White Paper could have benefited from greater precision in the planning of 
the transitional arrangements whereby an orderly process of secession and 
admission to membership could be achieved.   
26. In addition, the White Paper asserts: ‘Following a vote for independence 
Scotland will declare and notify our intention to assume responsibility for the 
UK’s multilateral and bilateral treaties, where it is in Scotland’s interest to do 
so. The Scottish Government expects that other parties to these treaties will 
welcome Scotland’s intention to sign up to, and continue, these obligations.’34 
This suggests that the Scottish Government intends to assert a claim to 
automatic succession to membership and treaty participation in at least 
certain cases. If this be the case, in light of the problems analysed above, the 
statement wants explanation and substantiation.  
 
Obstacles to Scotland’s membership of the European Union 
 
Membership of the European Union 
27. Unlike the UN and the Council of Europe, the EU raises significant obstacles 
to a smooth and seamless membership transition for Scotland. The 
fundamental problem is the need for unanimous agreement by the EU 
institutions and Member States. Political problems include: 1) the requirement 
that acceding States adopt the euro; 2) the UK budget rebate; and 3) UK opt-
outs from areas such as the Schengen Agreement. In light these substantive 
issues, the practice of international organisations, the existence of a formal 
EU accession procedure and the need therein for unanimity of EU Member 
States for the admission to membership of an independent Scotland,35 it is 
improbable that Scotland would be able to automatically succeed to EU 
membership. I respectfully concur with Professors Crawford and Boyle, who 
advise: ‘In practice, to an even greater extent than questions of state 
continuity or membership of the UN, the consequences of Scottish 
independence within the EU will depend on the attitude of other EU Member 
States and organs, and on negotiations.’36 
28. There is no express provision addressing the legal consequences of the 
secession of a territorial unit of a Member State either in the Treaty on 
European Union (‘TEU’) or in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.37 Nor is there precedent in the history of the organisation establishing 
a mechanism for the orderly management of State succession. Whilst Article 
3(5) TEU refers to the Union contributing to ‘the strict observance and the 
development of international law’, which provides scope for general 
international law acting as a gap-filler in the EU legal order, the approach of 
the VCSS and customary international law has been to defer to the rules of 
the international organisation concerned – particularly where, as in the case 
                                                 
34 White Paper, 226.  
35 Treaty on European Union, C 83/13 Official Journal of the European Union (30 March 2010), Art. 49. 
36 Crawford-Boyle Legal Opinion, para. 144.  
37 C 83/47 Official Journal of the European Union (30 March 2010).  
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of the EU, there exists a procedure for the admission of new members. Thus, 
as opined by Professors Crawford and Boyle,38 there exists no requirement to 
extend automatic succession to Scotland either in the EU treaties or in 
general international law.  
29. However, as explained above with reference to UN membership, the need for 
Scotland to accede to the EU as a new Member State does not preclude the 
possibility of a smooth transitional process whereby the EU acquis 
communautaire would continue to apply in Scotland in an interregnum period 
pending the admission of Scotland. According to this approach, it is 
conceivable – and, indeed, desirable – for the European Communities Act 
1972 to remain in force in Scotland until a date for the admission of Scotland 
to the EU, to be agreed upon in accession negotiations. This is the approach 
that the White Paper envisages.39  
Political problems 
30. Although the proposed accession date of 24 March 2016 may be criticised as 
premature, as it is dependent upon a process of negotiation that is 
necessarily incapable of timetabling, the general process foreseen of 
transitional arrangements is realistic and rational. However, whilst it is 
possible that the Article 48 TEU ordinary revision procedure would be applied 
to Scotland as proposed in paragraph 256 of the White Paper, in my view it is 
more likely that the normal accession procedure set out in Article 49 TEU 
would be followed as that is the purpose for which it was expressly designed. 
Even if the Article 48 were used, its practical effect upon the timeline would 
be unlikely to be as significant as that of the speedy resolution of the 
substantive issues to be addressed in the negotiations themselves.   
31. Moreover, the assertion in paragraph 263 of the White Paper that ‘Scotland 
will not be an accession state’ is predicated upon the agreement of the EU 
Member States and institutions. Even if the Article 48 ordinary revision 
procedure were to be employed instead of the usual Article 49 route, it would 
require: 1) a proposal of amendments by a Member State, the European 
Commission or the European Parliament; 2) the approval of a simple majority 
of the European Council, in consultation with the Parliament and Commission, 
to examine the proposed amendments; 3) the unanimous recommendation by 
a convention composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, of the 
Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission; 4) the unanimous adoption by the 
Member States in a conference of the proposed amendments; and 5) the 
ratification by all of the Member States of the amendments in accordance with 
their constitutional procedures. Consequently, it is disingenuous to flatly 
assert that Scotland will not be treated by the EU as an accession State when 
the decision to do so is taken by the institutions and Member States. It is also 
inconsistent with the acknowledgement at page 221 of the White Paper: ‘The 
Scottish Government recognises [that] it will be for the EU member states, 
                                                 
38 Crawford-Boyle Legal Opinion, para. 164.  
39 White Paper, para. 457 (para. 256).  
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meeting under the auspices of the [European] Council, to take forward the 
most appropriate procedure under which an independent Scotland will 
become a signatory to the EU Treaties at the point at which it become 
independent, taking into account Scotland’s status as an EU jurisdiction of 40 
[years’] standing.’40 
32. Similarly, I take issue with the premise of the White Paper41 that Scotland ‘will 
not be forced to join the Euro’ in response to the question posed: ‘Will 
Scotland be forced to join the Euro?’ Although it is in narrow terms accurate 
that ‘no country can be forced to join the Euro against its will’, the question 
posed is nevertheless imprecise. The real question is whether a condition for 
admission will be set by the EU requiring Scotland to join the Eurozone and 
the Schengen Area or it would be afforded an opt-out from either or both 
regimes. Were such a condition to be imposed, it would be open to Scotland 
to decline to pursue EU membership and make alternative arrangements 
whether as a member of the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) or, in a more extreme case, through 
ad hoc bilateral arrangements with the EU (Vatican City, Andorra, Monaco 
and San Marino).  
33. This is necessarily a political question that would be addressed in accession 
negotiations between the Scottish Government, the UK Government and the 
European Commission. It is consequently not the prerogative of the Scottish 
Government to unilaterally insist upon opt-outs when it would have the status 
of a candidate country during such negotiations. The White Paper glosses 
over the distinct possibility that the Commission would insist that a condition 
for Scotland’s accession to the Union will be its entry into the Eurozone and 
the Schengen Agreement – as indeed has been the practice for all candidate 
countries in the last two waves of enlargement. The White Paper thus fails to 
acknowledge the existence of a real possibility that ought to be submitted for 
public debate in order to inform the electorate for the referendum.  
34. The analysis put forward in the White Paper42 essentially argues that, 
whereas the EU Treaties provide for a right, not a duty, to join the Eurozone: 
‘If a national government decides not to join the ERM, as it is entitled to do so, 
then by definition it cannot become eligible for membership of the 
Eurozone.’43 This is inconsistent both with the power of the Union institutions 
to set admission conditions for membership44 and with the power of the 
European Council to determine that a Member State does not fulfil the 
necessary conditions for the adoption of the euro.45 Such a Member State is 
thereafter termed a ‘Member State with a derogation’, to which transitional 
provisions apply until its eventual qualification for admission to the Eurozone. 
                                                 
40 See also White Paper, page 460 (para. 264).  
41 Ibidem, 459 (para. 260).  
42 Ibidem, 222-223.  
43 Ibidem, 223.  
44 TEU, Art. 49. 
45 TFEU, Art. 139.  
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The architecture of the Treaties is premised upon all EU Member States, 
except for those that have already secured an opt-out, joining the Eurozone.   
35. In light of the public comment made by the President of the European 
Commission,46 it is likely that the European Commission would set admission 
conditions requiring Scotland to join the euro, Justice and Home Affairs and 
Schengen Area and not receive a budget rebate. The White Paper does not 
candidly acknowledge this possibility in that it asserts that ‘there are no 
circumstances in which the Scottish Government would countenance any 
measure being taken that jeopardized [Scotland’s participation in the 
Common Travel Area]’,47 ‘there are absolutely no grounds to believe that the 
EU would challenge Scotland remaining part of the CTA rather than joining 
the Schengen Area’48 and ‘prior to 2020, the division of the share of the UK 
rebate will be a matter for agreement between the Scottish and Westminster 
Governments and the Scottish Government will argue for an equitable 
share.’49 
36. In summary, the fundamental flaw in the programme set out in the White 
Paper is that it fails to acknowledge that the EU membership of an 
independent Scotland would require the agreement of the EU institutions and 
Member States, which may well decide not to offer Scotland opt-outs 
comparable to those that the UK would continue to enjoy from the Eurozone, 
Schengen Area, Justice and Home Affairs as well as the budget rebate. This 
does not provide a realistic assessment of a probable and foreseeable 
outcome of the accession negotiations. It would be more efficacious to 
expressly recognise this prospect in order to enrich the pre-referendum public 
debate and thus enhance the value of the referendum itself as a decision on a 
clear choice between the certainty of the existing position within the UK and 
the probability of a different position without the UK vis-à-vis the EU. 
  
The potential for a ruling by the Court of Justice 
 
37. The Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) does not have an 
express procedure to act as a constitutional court in the manner of 
constitutional courts of Romano-Germanic countries, namely, by receiving an 
application to adjudicate a constitutional question and then deciding on the 
meaning and effect of the constitution.50 Although there are broader questions 
as to whether such a constitutional jurisdiction would be desirable, in the 
present context the existence of such a jurisdiction would potentially simplify 
the independence debate by clarifying the legal framework for EU 
                                                 
46 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/economic-
affairs/ScottishIndependence/EA68_Scotland_and_the_EU_Barroso%27s_reply_to_Lord_Tugendhat_1012
12.pdf.  
47 White Paper, 223.  
48 Ibidem, 224. 
49 Ibidem, 460 (para. 265).  
50 The CJEU does have jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of the Treaties but its jurisdiction is triggered 
in a manner different to national constitutional courts – TFEU, Art. 267. 
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membership. A direct action between two Member States for failure to 
perform a treaty obligation (an unlikely prospect in relation to the Scottish 
case) may be brought directly before the CJEU.51 
38. Professors Crawford and Boyle opine that the CJEU would in practice be 
unlikely to have the opportunity to adjudicate the matter.52 Whilst they 
recognise the possibility of a preliminary reference from a UK court in 
response to an action taken by an individual, they doubt that it would happen 
in time to influence the process of Scottish independence and EU 
accession.53 In their view: ‘In any event, there is virtually no chance that the 
ECJ would be called on to consider the question on the basis solely of 
existing EU law. More likely, the UK, Scotland and the EU will negotiate and 
agree on arrangements for Scottish independence that would form the actual 
subject matter of any consideration by the ECJ. This view is strengthened by 
the fact that there is no express provision on the point in the EU treaties: it will 
probably be treated as a sui generis matter to be dealt with by the member 
states, at least initially, rather than the ECJ.’54 
39. Whilst these conclusions are considerably strengthened by the scant time 
available for potential adjudication before the CJEU until the referendum, the 
consequent lack of opportunity for judicial clarification of essentially legal 
matters is regrettable. Consequently, I recommend that the Committee 
consider a recommendation to the Scottish Government to consider the 
possibility of bringing legal action before the CJEU to seek clarification55 
concerning, in particular: 1) whether an independent Scotland would be 
required to accede to the EU under Article 49 or whether the ordinary revision 
procedure under Article 48 may be employed; and 2) whether it would be in 
accordance with the EU Treaties for Scotland to be afforded opt-outs in the 
areas identified above. Whilst the avenue for the bringing of such a claim is 
not clear, as a violation of EU law would have to be identified and a Scottish 
court would need to make a preliminary reference to Luxembourg, it is 
possible that the agreement of the EU Commission and/or the UK 
Government could be solicited in order to bring the claim for the purpose of 
seeking declaratory relief.56  
40. The utility of judicial input is strengthened by the distinct possibility that the 
political mandate of a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum would be obviated by the 
outcome of the negotiations. To wit, were the ‘Yes’ campaign to successfully 
fight and win the referendum on the basis of an independent Scotland 
obtaining the key opt-outs in negotiations with the EU as set out in the White 
Paper, and were the EU to reject Scottish demands for all or even one of 
those opt-outs, and were litigation before the CJEU to subsequently agree 
                                                 
51 TFEU, Art. 259.  
52 Crawford-Boyle Legal Opinion, para. 172.  
53 Ibidem, para. 172.1. 
54 Ibidem, para. 172.2. 
55 E.g. – an opinion pursuant to TFEU, Art. 218(11).  
56 TFEU, Art. 267. 
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with the EU position, then the political mandate of the Scottish Government 
for independence would arguably be invalidated as a ‘Yes’ result from the 
referendum would have been predicated upon conditions for independence 
that would not be obtainable. In this scenario, even if the ‘Yes’ campaign to 
win the referendum, it would lose its campaign for independence. 
41. Consequently, it is more desirable to seek judicial clarification of these key 
legal questions prior to the referendum (if practicable) in order to facilitate an 
informed public debate concerning the implications for Scottish EU 
membership and thus provide the Scottish Government with a political 
mandate for conducting negotiations. In this respect, the realistic scenario of 
the Scottish Government failing to obtain all of its demands for opt-outs 
should be clarified with an alternative plan of EFTA membership with sterling, 
the CFA, etc. examined and debated.  
    
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
42. This submission offers the following conclusions:  
 
1) the law of State succession is regrettably underdeveloped and confused 
so that the Scotland secession case has exposed a need for normativity 
and standardisation; 
2) automatic succession to membership of international organisations 
through Article 34 VCSS does not apply to Scottish succession to 
membership in key international organisations such as the UN and EU 
through customary international law due to the inconsistent and confused 
practice; 
3) automatic succession to participation in bilateral or multilateral treaties 
would depend upon the notification of the Scottish Government and the 
acceptance of such notification by the other parties to those treaties; 
4) Scotland would be required to accede to the UN as a new Member State 
but would be unlikely to encounter difficulties in doing so; 
5) Negotiation of Scottish membership of the EU could be accomplished 
‘from within’ whereby EU law would seamlessly apply in Scotland as part 
of the UK pending its accession to the EU as a transitional arrangement; 
6) The ‘independence date’ of 24 March 2016 is unlikely to entail a 
comprehensive and incisive transition to independence with respect to 
membership in international organisations, in that a phased transition may 
occur depending upon the progress of negotiations; 
7) It is likelier that Scotland would be required by the EU to accede to the 
Union as a new Member State in accordance with Article 49 TEU rather 
than the proposed ordinary amendment procedure under Article 48 TEU; 
8) The fundamental failure in the White Paper is to acknowledge that the 
conditions for EU membership of an independent Scotland would be set 
by the EU institutions and Member States (even if the Article 48 procedure 
envisaged in the White Paper were employed) and consequently the 
Scottish Government cannot guarantee to the Scottish electorate, as it 
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suggests in the White Paper, that its preferred conditions of accession will 
be achieved by negotiations; 
9) Although the absence of a constitutional reference jurisdiction for the 
Court of Justice is regrettable, judicial clarification of these legal questions 
is nevertheless desirable in order to facilitate an informed referendum and 
thus provide a clear political mandate for subsequent negotiations in the 
event of a ‘yes’ vote.  
 
43. This submission offers the following recommendations: 
 
1) the Committee should criticise the failure by the Scottish Government in 
the White Paper to acknowledge that the conditions of EU membership for 
Scotland may realistically entail requirements to join the Eurozone, 
Schengen Area, Justice and Home Affairs and/or no budget rebate; 
2) the Committee should recommend that the possibility be explored by the 
Scottish Government of legal action before the General Court or CJEU in 
order to seek judicial clarification of succession or accession to EU 
membership; 
3) the Committee should specifically seek clarification of alternative plans by 
the Scottish Government for Scottish membership of EFTA in the event 
that the membership conditions laid down by the EU prove to be politically 
unacceptable; 
4) the Committee should seek clarification of the position of the Scottish 
Government concerning transitional arrangements as between it and the 
UK Government for responsibility for human rights claims pending Scottish 
accession to the Council of Europe.  
 
24 January 2014 
 
